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A fundamental aspect of the “I” of conscious experience is that the self is experienced as a single coherent repre-
sentation of the entire, spatially situated body. The purpose of the present study was to investigate agency for the
entire body. We provided participants with performance-related auditory cues and induced online sensorimotor
conflicts in free walking conditions investigating the limits of human consciousness in moving agents. We show
that the control of full-body locomotion and the building of a conscious experience of it are at least partially
distinct brain processes. The comparable effects on agency using audio-motor and visuo-motor cues as found in
the present and previous agency work may reflect common supramodal mechanisms in conscious action monitoring.
Our data may help to refine the scientific criteria of selfhood and are of relevance for the investigation of neurological
and psychiatric patients with disturbance of selfhood.
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INTRODUCTION
In a scene from The Man Who Knew Too Much
(Alfred Hitchcock, 1956), Dr Ben McKenna played
by Jimmy Stewart walks down an empty street in
London. He is searching for his son Hank who he
believes was kidnapped by a couple in Morocco two
days earlier. Dr McKenna is alone and suspects that
people may be following him. Actor and audience hear
footsteps that do not seem to come from Dr McKenna’s
feet. However, the heard footsteps slow down, stop,
accelerate as Dr McKenna slows down, stops, and
accelerates. Where are the footsteps coming from? Is
someone following Dr McKenna? Do they reflect a
loud and distorted echo of his footsteps? Dr McKenna
turns around several times during that sequence but
sees nobody else. Determining whether we are caus-
ing the perceptual events that we perceive or whether
somebody or something else causes these events is an
important function and is generally referred to as
agency. How do I know whether I am causing the
rhythmic sounds of footsteps? When do I begin to
suspect that another agent is causing the sounds
I hear?
“Actions are critical steps in the interaction
between the self and the external milleu” (Jeannerod,
2007) and may reveal—especially when self-generated
and not responses to external events—the intentions,
states, and goals of the acting self. Moreover, such self-
generated actions also alter the perceptual environment.
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CONSCIOUS GAIT MONITORING 185
Previous work has shown that agency judgments can
be influenced by the manipulation of perceptual and
sensorimotor cues during different phases of action
execution (Farrer et al., 2008; Fourneret & Jeannerod,
1998; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Knoblich
& Kircher, 2004; Sato & Yasuda, 2005). Thus, it has
been tested whether discrepancies between sensory
predictions and the actual sensory input (re-afference)
may lead participants to judge self-generated actions
as externally generated. Following early work by
Nielsen (1963), this latter form of agency (or con-
scious action monitoring) has recently been the topic
of intensive research (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998;
Franck et al., 2001). In these studies participants’
agency was measured in response to varied sensorim-
otor incongruencies between visual and motor (and
proprioceptive) signals (that are generally congruent
during action execution). In these studies the authors
investigated sensorimotor conflicts by manipulating
the visual position of the participant’s hand as seen on
a computer screen and the participant’s actual hand
while a simple goal-directed motor task was carried
out. Participants were asked to direct their hand to a
specified target position. Direct vision of the partici-
pant’s hand during the target-directed action was
occluded and visual feedback of the arm movements
(again as seen on a computer screen) was systemati-
cally deviated from its actual movement path.
These studies showed that participants automati-
cally aligned their hand trajectories with a visual
target on the computer screen while compensating for
a displayed spatial deviation. The participants were
often unaware of their online movement corrections
and judged many of these movements as non-deviated;
these data also revealed that agency decreased with
increasing sensorimotor incongruency between these
visual and motor cues. In a similar experimental
set-up, Franck et al. (2001) investigated the influence
of temporal cues on agency judgments. The authors
introduced different temporal delays between the
visual position of the participant’s hand (as seen on a
computer screen) and the participant’s actual hand
while the same motor task was carried out. As observed
for spatial deviations, increasing delay durations
between visual and sensorimotor cues were found to
decrease agency (see also Shimada, Qi, & Hiraki,
2010).
Most previous work has focused on the investiga-
tion of performance-related visual cues on agency
(Daprati et al., 1997; Farrer et al., 2003, 2008; Fourneret
& Jeannerod, 1998; Franck et al., 2001; Knoblich &
Kircher, 2004; Shimada et al., 2010; Tsakiris,
Haggard, Franck, Mainy, & Sirigu, 2005; van den Bos
& Jeannerod, 2002). Auditory action consequences
may differ in their effects from visual action conse-
quences, as the auditory detection of temporal dis-
crepancies may be an especially powerful agency cue
due to the excellent timing of auditory perception. In
spite of this such auditory effects on agency have only
rarely been tested (Asai & Tanno, 2008; Knoblich &
Repp, 2009; Repp & Knoblich, 2007; Sato & Yasuda,
2005).
The above example from the The Man Who
Knew Too Much points to a fundamental difference
between the conscious monitoring of actions as
tested in most of the previous agency work and
conscious monitoring related to questions such as
“How do I know whether the footsteps I hear are
mine?” Almost all previous work on agency has
focused on the investigation of performance-related
sensory cues for upper limb actions (actions of fin-
gers, hands, or arms). Yet a fundamental aspect of
the “I” of conscious experience is that the self is
experienced as a single coherent representation of
the entire, spatially situated body, not as several
separate body parts (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009).
Recently, several experimental procedures have
been reported that allow one to test full-body own-
ership or the conscious experience of identifying
with one’s body and of being localized within one’s
body (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager, Mouthon, &
Blanke, 2009; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, &
Blanke, 2007; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008) and such
changes in full-body ownership have also been
shown to modify the perception of tactile stimuli
(Aspell, Lenggenhager, & Blanke, 2009). Concern-
ing agency and because the participants’ body posi-
tion was kept constant (except for actions of finger,
hand, or arm), previous agency studies did not
investigate this fundamental aspect of the global
bodily self, because this requires movement of the
entire body of the participant as during locomotion.
Footstep-related signals during locomotion are
probably one of the most common performance-
related auditory cues (alongside speech or eating)
and of significant relevance for the self. This is
suggested by the scene from The Man Who Knew
Too Much and by clinical data in neurological
patients (i.e. Blanke, Ortigue, Coeytaux, Martory,
& Landis, 2003). Moreover, walking differs from
upper limb actions in several physiological ways: Gait
is cyclic, more rarely immediately goal-directed, and
is generally considered a highly automatic and uncon-
scious action with important control centres in spinal
cord and brainstem (Armstrong, 1988; Grillner &
Wallen, 1985). Collectively, these data suggest that







































186 MENZER ET AL.
To investigate conscious action monitoring for
the entire body we asked participants to make
agency judgments during locomotion. For this we
developed a portable device that allows the intro-
duction of different systematic temporal delays
between the participants’ footsteps and the auditory
consequences of those footsteps. This was com-
bined with an analysis of the walking speed during
the different tested delays. We predicted that an
increase in delay should lead to a decrease in
agency judgments as observed in previous arm
agency studies, but that longer delays (those
approaching the next footstep) would lead to
increases in agency judgments.
METHODS
Participants
Eleven healthy participants with normal or
corrected-to-normal hearing (five female; one left-
handed), aged 21–30 years, volunteered for the exper-
iment. Experiments were conducted in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki and accepted by the
local ethics commission (University Hospital of
Lausanne).
Procedure
After a participant’s shoes were removed and
replaced with experimental shoes (see below), we
taped the microphone chords to the participant’s trousers
and the microphones to their shoes, and the backpack
in which the laptop computer running the experiment
software was carried and the eyewear were donned
(Figure 1). In order to minimize visual contributions
to the task, participants were instructed to keep their
heads up and not to inspect the patterns of movement
of their limbs (controlled by experimenter). Partici-
pants also wore occluding eyewear such that visual
information from below the head was impaired (field
of view was limited to ∼15° × ∼15°).
After this, participants performed as many baseline
trials as necessary to familiarize themselves with the
experimental setup, walking, and task. They were
instructed to walk continuously in a clockwise circuit
prescribed by a cordoned-off hallway measuring 20 × 4 m
(Figure 1). Individual trials were initiated by them-
selves via a button on a handheld wireless device.
Two other buttons were assigned as “response” but-
tons. Two alternative forced-choice judgments were
registered before further trials could commence. Partici-
pants were instructed not to initiate trials on their
approach to the turn at the end of the hallway, but
rather to wait to initiate the next trial until the com-
mencement of their walk down the length of the space
(to minimize potential left–right differences in the
auditory cues that would be associated with turning in
a consistent (clockwise) direction). Participants were
instructed to walk at a normal and relaxed speed at all
times (as if they were “taking a stroll along a foot-
path”) and informed that trials would be presented in
four blocks, and that between those blocks they would
have the opportunity to be seated and take a drink of
water (break duration was determined by participant
comfort; average duration of each block was 6 min 22
s, ±48 s; SD).
Blocks consisted of randomly selected trials from
each auditory delay condition. The duration of each
individual trial was 7 s. This allowed each participant
to take on average 11.3 footsteps (±1.1 footsteps; SD)
in each delay condition. After each trial participants
were instructed to respond by “yes” or “no” as to
whether the walking that they heard over the head-
phones corresponded to the walking they had just
performed. We analyzed the percentage of “yes”
responses (agency judgment). We studied audio-motor
agency based on experimental paradigms and agency
questions that are comparable to those employed in
previous work on visuo-motor agency (Fourneret &
Jeannerod, 1998; Franck et al., 2001; Kannape,
Schwabe, Tadi, & Blanke, in press; Shimada
et al., 2010).
Figure 1. Experimental setup. (Left) A participant wearing the
recording and stimulation system. (Right) Plan of the hallway
(measuring 20 m × 4 m) where particpants were instructed to walk
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Materials
The individual footsteps were recorded by micro-
phones (Voice Technologies VT 500, Switzerland)
that were attached to each shoe (tip; Figure 1).
These recordings were presented binaurally, with a
delay determined by the condition from which the
trial was selected. Conditions were presented in
randomized fashion and participants wore closed
headphones with high ambient noise attenuation
(BeyerDynamic DT 770M, Germany).
Auditory delays were implemented via custom-
made software on a portable computer (MacBook
2.16 GHz Core 2 Duo, USA), carried by participants
in a backpack. We tested 19 different temporal delays
ranging from 16 to 1800 ms that were implemented
“online” while participants were walking. Each condi-
tion was repeated 20 times and represented a different
delay between the actual footstep and the presented
auditory cue associated with the actual footstep. The
tested delays are shown in Figure 2. The minimal
delay the system was able to provide was 16 ms. For
each trial the gait period was determined from the
audio signal recorded by the microphones. The gait
period was calculated as the position of the maximum
of the autocorrelation of the signal’s envelope outside
of the range of 0–0.8 s (assuming that the gait period
is >0.8 s). The custom software allowed for precision
recording of the auditory profile of participants’ foot-
steps over time. To exclude personal “shoe-specific”
auditory signals, all participants wore the same pair of
experimental shoes, adjusted for size via an ankle
strap. A hand-held device (Wii Remote, Nintendo,
Japan) was used to register, after each trial, the partic-
ipant’s agency judgment. For statistical analysis a
within-subjects design was used.
RESULTS
Agency judgments
Data from the agency judgment task were collated
across participants for each delay condition and are
represented in Figure 2A, showing that agency judg-
ments depend on delay. As predicted, the data reveal
the highest percentage of confirmatory agency judg-
ments (∼90%) for delays of 16 and 100 ms which rap-
idly decrease to 34% and 28% for delays between 250
and 450 ms. For 450–750ms delays, the percentage of
agency judgments increased continuously to ∼75%.
Over the next 750 ms this sinusoidal pattern was
repeated (maximum of ∼65% at 1300 ms). A 4 param-
eter damped sine wave model fitted to the data yields
an R2 value of .92, thus explaining 92% of the vari-
ance (significant fit; p < .05). These data provide
evidence of a predictable relationship between agency
judgments and the extent of the auditory delay.
We next analyzed whether the damping with
increasing delays reflects increased variability of the
peaks of maximal and minimal agency judgments for
larger delays. Inspection of individual data (Figure 2B)
shows that agency judgments were as precise (and as
elevated) as for the minimal delay of 16 ms in most
participants, showing that variability does not account
for dampening. Moreover, the sinusoidal pattern sug-
gests that the cyclic nature of walking (Murray, 1967;
Blanc Balmer, C., Landis, T., & Vingerhoets,, 1999)
interfered with agency judgments. Gait agency may
depend not only on delay, but also on gait cycle and
gait speed. All participants were instructed to walk at
their habitual speed, but as stride length and walking
speed depend on individualistic parameters (i.e.,
height and leg length; Macellari, Giacomozzi, &
Saggini, 1999), we next analyzed our participants’
walking speed.
Figure 2. Uncorrected agency judgments. A. The plot shows
agency judgments (mean ± 1 SD) across delay conditions. The data
show that agency judgments depend on the delay (i.e. initial
decrease in agency judgments until ∼450 ms). The sinusoidal
pattern suggests that the cyclic nature of walking also influences
agency judgments. Note the dampening of the sinusoidal pattern
with increasing delays. B. Individual data from three participants
are shown (S1, S2, S9). These data show that agency judgments
were as precise (and as elevated) as for the minimal delay of 16 ms.






































188 MENZER ET AL.
Gait-period and walking speed depend 
on delay
Analysing the gait period of each participant as a
function of delay condition, we found that the
average gait period was 1.25 s (0.13 s (SD); range:
1.01–1.79 s) and that this varied systematically with
the delay period in a sinusoidal pattern (Figure 3).
On average participants’ footsteps were separated by
613 ms, compatible with physiological data in healthy
subjects (Blanc, Balmer, Landis, & Vingerhoets,
1999; Macellari et al., 1999). Figure 3 depicts that the
gait period (walking speed) showed small variations
as a function of the delay conditions. We found a first
maximum of the gait period at ∼0.4 s, followed by a
minimum at ∼0.6 s, a maximum at ∼0.9 s, another
minimum at ∼1.2 s, and a final maximum at ∼1.5 s.
The delay conditions with smallest gait period (or
fastest walking speed) overlapped with the delay con-
ditions for which we found that agency judgments
reached maximal values (compare with Figure 2A),
comparable to those at the minimal delay (16 ms).
These data show that participants’ walking speed
depended on the delay period, increasing after each
stride and decreasing at each stride, although they
were not aware of this (as revealed by questioning
after the end of the experiment) and were instructed
to walk at a normal habitual speed throughout the
experiment.
Gait-corrected agency judgments
This makes it possible that the decrease in sine wave
amplitude that we observed for agency judgments
across delays is a consequence of the phase relation-
ship between auditory delay and individual gait period.
We converted the delay conditions (in s) to normal-
ized delay conditions for each participant (the propor-
tion of the delay with respect to the participant’s gait
period). The resulting data are represented in Figure 4.
As can be seen in Figure 4, these gait-corrected
Figure 3. Gait period is shown as a function of delay condition for three individual subjects (A–C) and all participants (D). The average gait
period showed small but systematic variation with the delay period in a sinusoidal pattern for the three depicted participants (S2, S3, S5).
Because the participants with longer gait periods (higher curve on y-axis) also had slower varying gait period vs. delay curves (curve stretched
along the x-axis), the average data across all participants (Figure 3D) were obtained by stretching the individual curves by the same factor in x
and y direction until their mean was the same as the previously calculated mean gait period, and subsequently taking the mean over all
stretched curves. Thus, before calculating the average curve, the curve of each participant was stretched along the dotted lines until their mean
matched the average gait period across all participants. Note that the delay conditions with smallest gait period (or fastest walking speed) overlap






































CONSCIOUS GAIT MONITORING 189
agency data show no decrease or damping in sine
wave amplitude across delays, suggesting that the
decrease observed for the gait-uncorrected agency
data is due to an influence of the variable gait periods
between averaged individuals. Gait-corrected agency
data are best fit by a sine wave function, and this func-
tion explains a significant amount of the variance (R2
= .92, p < .05). Based on this model, we note that at
the points of objective simultaneity, participants relia-
bly made confirmatory agency judgments (based on
the model that was the case for approximately 75% of
trials). Recalibration of the observed 75% threshold
with actual gait periods suggests the range of delays
across which perceived simultaneity reliably was
reported to be ∼113 ms.
DISCUSSION
Auditory and visual effects on gait 
agency
Confirmatory gait agency judgments (the percentage
of “yes” responses) in the present experiment
decreased rapidly for delays > 120 ms and reached a
first minimum at 400–500 ms. To the best of our
knowledge, agency during gait movements has not
been tested using either audio-motor or visuo-motor
conflicts. Our data may be compared with those
described by Sato and Yasuda (2005; Experiment 2)
testing agency for hand movements using finger but-
ton presses and audio-motor conflicts. These authors
also observed strongly diminished agency judgments
for delays > 250 ms that further decreased until 600
ms. Yet this comparison is hampered by the fact that
the actions tested by Sato and Yasuda (2005) were
single, goal-directed movements that were in addition
associated with two different auditory action conse-
quences (congruent and incongruent tones). This also
applies to the comparison of our data with those
reported by Asai & Tanno (2008), who also used fin-
ger button presses and manipulated the timing of
auditory action consequences, but reported a strong
decrease in such agency judgments for delays > ∼100
ms. Comparison with the interesting auditory agency
data by Knoblich and Repp is also difficult, as experts
and naïve participants were asked to detect the
moment of transition between externally and self-con-
trolled tapping sequences (Knoblich & Repp, 2009;
Repp & Knoblich, 2007). Our data manipulating
performance-related auditory cues are comparable
with data manipulating performance-related visual
cues. Thus, Franck et al. (2001) measured agency
judgments of hand actions (joystick movements) and
tested different delays between a movement and a
visually presented movement. They observed mostly
self agency judgments for delays < 100 ms and mostly
non-self agency judgments for delays > 150 ms. A
comparable value of visual-motor delay has been
reported by Farrer et al. (2008; Study 1; ∼120 ms) and
Shimada et al. (2010; ∼230 ms) using similar hand
movement tasks and feedback conditions. Collec-
tively, these studies using visuo-motor and audio-
motor conflict report similar values at which agency
judgments decrease, ∼100–200 ms. These findings are
also similar to those employing spatial visuo-motor
conflict to manipulate agency (i.e. Daprati et al.,
1997; Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Franck et al.,
2001; Knoblich & Kircher, 2004; van den Bos &
Jeannerod, 2002).
This similarity when judging temporal delays
between visuo-motor and audio-motor cues is surpris-
ing considering the excellent temporal resolution of
the auditory system and the relatively poor temporal
resolution of the visual system. Moreover, the delay
values of ∼100–200 ms are far above the threshold for
auditory temporal order judgments of ∼20 ms (Hirsh,
1959 and Hirsh & Sherick, 1961; cited in Knoblich &
Repp, 2009). We therefore suggest that this similarity
reflects common, supramodal, mechanisms in the
Figure 4. Gait-corrected agency judgments (mean ± 1 SD) across
normalized delay conditions. Delay conditions (in s) were converted
to normalized delay conditions for each participant (the proportion
of the delay with respect to the participant’s gait period). Values on
the x-axis represent the gait-normalized delay conditions and values
on the y-axis show agency judgments. Concerning normalized delay
conditions, 0 and 1 represent time points of objective simultaneity.
That is, they represent the conditions in which auditory and sensori-
motor events objectively were in phase (although for the 1.0 condition,
the auditory signal participants heard while simultaneously taking a
step with the left foot was actually generated from the previous left
footstep). The 0.5 and 1.5 points also represent points of objective
simultaneity, but this time with pedal (left/right) crossover. So, in
these conditions, simultaneous to taking a left footstep, participants
heard the auditory signal associated with a previous right footstep.
Note that the absence of agency judgment decreases around the






































190 MENZER ET AL.
conscious action monitoring of auditory and visual
action consequences. This is compatible with a com-
parison of the predicted and actual consequences of
actions and gait (Frith et al., 2000) or the presence of
a dedicated “who-system” (Georgieff & Jeannerod,
1998; Jeannerod, 2006) that is independent of the
sensory modality tested. Given the relative rarity of
studies testing the effects of performance-related audi-
tory cues on agency, this has to be regarded with caution
and may depend on the employed agency manipulation
and task and may differ between explicit and implicit
agency judgments (Repp & Knoblich, 2007).
Gait and bodily self-consciousness
Although gait has been considered initially a largely
automatic action regulated mainly by subcortical
control mechanisms, recent work has highlighted
the influence of attentional, executive and other cog-
nitive mechanisms (Shaw, 2002; Yogev-Seligmann,
Hausdorff, & Giladi, 2008). Walking is a complex
task involving the integration of locomotion, balance,
and adaptation in an ever-changing environment
(Armstrong, 1988; Blanc et al., 1999; Drew, Prentice,
& Schepens, 2004). Moreover, the neuroscience of
upright gait is hampered by two main caveats.
Neuroimaging using functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), magnetoencephalography (MEG), or
electroencephalography (EEG) is currently not avail-
able or severely limited in walking humans (but see
Fukuyama et al., 1997; Miyai et al., 2001) and
humans are the only truly upright walking primates
(i.e. Eccles, 1989). The neuroscience of walking is
thus almost entirely based on findings in quadrupeds
and behavioral work in patients with gait disorders,
pointing to a distributed network including spinal
cord, brainstem, basal ganglia, cerebellum, motor and
posterior parietal cortex (motor cortex: Armstrong,
1988; Drew et al., 2004; spinal cord: Grillner &
Wallen, 1985; Nutt, Marsden, & Thompson, 1993).
The present data extend the data on cognitive gait
mechanisms (Lundin-Olsson, Nyberg, & Gustafson,
1997; Shaw, 2002; Yogev-Seligmann et al., 2008) by
revealing systematic conscious contributions to gait
control. This is compatible with findings suggesting
that human gait is a complex higher form of move-
ment characterized by many cognitive components
and likely represented at the cortical level.
In the case of conscious control for arm or hand
actions awareness is lacking for the movement of a
certain body part (in general the arm or the hand) of
the agent, but not for the position and locomotion of
the agent’s entire body. We have proposed that the “I”
of conscious experience of the self – which has been
linked to full-body representations (Blanke & Metz-
inger, 2009) – is not altered in these agency manipula-
tions of body parts. We propose that the present
procedure allowed us to manipulate the “I” of con-
scious experience or global bodily self, extending pre-
vious work on full-body ownership to full-body
agency (Ehrsson, 2007; Kannape et al., in press;
Lenggenhager et al., 2007, 2009; Petkova and Ehrs-
son, 2008). However despite these different func-
tional consequences of the movement of a person’s
body part or a person’s entire body, the present exper-
imental data suggest that humans rely on comparable
mechanisms for monitoring the action of a single
body part (i.e. arm) and their entire body.
Periodic gait agency
Due to the gait cycle and continuously alternating right
and left footsteps, those delays approaching the time of
the subsequent actual footstep were found to increase
agency judgments. Our data using gait-correction show
that participants under the present experimental con-
ditions were not aware of such moments of objective
simultaneity between auditory cues and subsequent
actual footsteps. This was found for all moments of
objective simultaneity (with and without pedal
crossover). When, simultaneous to taking a left (right)
footstep, participants heard the auditory signal associ-
ated with a previous right (left) footstep, they showed
no agency judgment differences. This suggests that
conscious gait monitoring, in addition to mechanisms
leading to gradual changes in agency judgments, also
depends on periodic changes in agency judgments that
depend on the participant’s gait period, independent of
pedal crossover. Periodic agency mechanisms have
also been described in trained and naïve subjects
during rhythmic tapping movements (Knoblich &
Repp, 2009; Repp & Knoblich, 2007). We speculate
that the reported independence of pedal crossover is
only present in “experts” in rhythmic stepping move-
ments and that there will be no comparable or less
strong effects of manual crossover in tapping studies.
Our data show that it is important to include the
actual movement in analysis, revealing that partici-
pants modified their walking speed depending on the
tested delay condition. Moreover, we found a highly
systematic influence of delay condition on walking
speed, leading to an increase for auditory delays that
were shorter than the first, second, and third subse-
quent footstep; followed by a decrease for auditory
delays that were longer than the first, second, and






































CONSCIOUS GAIT MONITORING 191
of gait period by auditory delay is reminiscent of
some cognitive effects on gait (Shaw, 2002; Yogev-
Seligmann et al., 2008) as dual task performance (i.e.,
counting or speaking while waking) may lead to
changes in walking speed that may in some subjects
(especially the elderly) even lead to gait arrest and
falling (Lundin-Olsson et al., 1997; Yogev-Seligmann
et al., 2008). The automatic modulation of gait period
is also reminiscent of spatial corrections of hand
movement trajectories during hand agency judgments
(Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Nielsen, 1963) for
which subjects are unaware.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the present study was to investigate
agency for the entire body by testing auditory action
effects related to gait. For this we designed a portable
stimulation and recording system in combination with
performance-related auditory cues, allowing us to
induce online sensorimotor conflicts and changes in
agency judgments in moving agents. We show that
the control of full-body locomotion and the building
of a conscious experience of it are at least partially
distinct brain processes. A comparison with the previ-
ous literature revealed that these delay-related agency
mechanisms were similar whether auditory or visual
consequences of actions were tested, compatible with
supramodal, modality-independent control mecha-
nisms. We argue that the further study of agency and
ownership for a person’s full body may help to refine
our scientific criteria of selfhood (Blanke & Metz-
inger, 2009) and are of relevance for neurological
conditions (Arzy, Seeck, Ortigue, Spinelli, & Blanke,
2006; Blanke et al., 2003) and psychiatric conditions
(Daprati et al., 1997; Franck et al., 2001) character-
ized by a disturbance of selfhood.
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